[footnoteRef:24] in the Archaic Period, Ancient Greece's initial maritime power was critical but also "sporadic."[footnoteRef:25] During the Classical Period, Athens in particular "pursued a policy of naval imperialism"[footnoteRef:26] and this Period saw the development of "siege warfare" in which the Greeks -- particularly the Athenians -- developed the skills to wage war on the open sea.[footnoteRef:27] in the Hellenistic Period, the scope of warfare was enlarged considerably, as whole areas of land were now in dispute. Consequently, there was an "ancient naval arms race"[footnoteRef:28] in which various kings extending beyond Greece fought for control of mainland Greece, islands of the Aegean, western Turkey and southern Syria.[footnoteRef:29] [21: EH.Net and C. Michael Hogan. "Economy of Ancient Greece." www.eoearth.org Web site. May 1, 2010. http://www.eoearth.org/article/Economy_of_Ancient_Greece (accessed January 17, 2013).] [22: Chester G. Starr. The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1989, 7.] [23: Ibid., 6.] [24: Ibid., 8.] [25: Starr, 8.] [26: Simon Hornblower. "Greece: The History of the Classical Period." In the Oxford History of Greece & the Hellenistic World, by John Boardman, Jasper Griffin, & Oswyn Murray, 142-176. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1986, 151.] [27: Ibid., 163.] [28: Simon Price. "The History of the Hellenistic Period." In the Oxford History of Greece & the Hellenistic World, by John Boardman, Jasper Griffin, & Oswyn Murray, 364-389. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1986, 374.] [29: Ibid., 376.] The Mediterranean was also highly important to the Romans.[footnoteRef:30] in contrast to the Greeks, however, the Romans built an extensive, paved road system that made land travel far easier, physically united Italy and helped centralize power. Roman access and power was far more balanced, Rome did not need to control the sea in order to conquer and Romans relied more heavily than did the Greeks on land forces.[footnoteRef:31] Nevertheless, Rome built up an imperial navy that was effective against such threats as piracy,[footnoteRef:32] was well-balanced and lasted essentially through the life of the empire.[footnoteRef:33] the Roman imperial navy remained such a significant force that...

[30: Starr, pp. 7-8.] [31: Ibid., p. 8.] [32: Ibid., p. 73.] [33: Ibid., p. 68.] [34: Ibid., p. 7.]
3. Question #3: Evaluate the Performance of the British Royal Navy and French Navy in the War for American Independence

The British Navy's performance was less effective than the French Navy's performance during the American Revolution. Despite the newness and weakness of the American Continental Navy, Captain John Paul Jones captured the HMS Drake on April 24, 1778, the HMS Serapis on September 23, 1779 and successfully attacked British port of Whitehaven in 1778,[footnoteRef:35] causing the British to redirect some efforts to shoring up their own ports due to their surprising vulnerability.[footnoteRef:36] in addition, private Continental ships seized hundreds of British ships during the war.[footnoteRef:37] France entered the War in 1778, not merely to aid American independence but also to serve its own interests by driving Britain from the West Indies and forcing Britain to dedicate forces, including naval forces, in the English Channel. In 1779, by joining forces with Spain and the Americans, the French Navy forced dedication of some British forces to securing the English Channel.[footnoteRef:38] the combined efforts of these foreign navies forced Britain to adjust its movements and allocation of forces, spreading its naval forces too thin.[footnoteRef:39] in addition, French naval forces captured British ships and troops, and invaded British strongholds in North America.[footnoteRef:40] Finally, on October 18, 1781, French naval forces succeeded in blockading British forces led by George Cornwallis in Yorktown, Virginia, leading to Cornwallis' surrender and peace negotiations.[footnoteRef:41] in sum, the French Navy was highly effective and significantly contributed to American independence by rendering the British Royal Navy far less effective. [35: N.A.M. Rodger. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2005, pp. 597-8.] [36: